विभूतिमूर्ति

‘THE HOUSE OF TRUTH’

Extract from a forthcoming book by Dr BSM Murty

Dr Rajendra Prasad

On the Kashmir Problem

Two years of Dr Prasad’s interim presidency had already gone by. Dr Rajendra Prasad, as the first popularly elected President, was now firmly in saddle with new governments at the centre and in the provinces committed to a coordinated re-building of the nation, with a Prime Minister dedicated to secular, democratic principles and a vision of India’s dignified participation in international affairs

Nehru’s fortnightly missives to the CMs in the states give a fairly comprehensive idea of the problems the government was facing and trying to solve and the policy lines it was following, particularly since the inaugural of the Republic. The President also was getting fortnightly reports from the governors in the states. There were two major vexatious issues of Kashmir and the rapidly worsening scenario of the reorganization of states on a linguistic basis.

Of particular gravity and concern was the continuing Kashmir tangle with its international ramifications. The recent assembly elections in Kashmir had redefined and aggravated the issue. The political situation in Kashmir was rapidly escalating into a mess by the turns and twists developing due to the communal factor and the international vested interest in the region that was of great strategic importance. Also, the Sheikh seemed to be drifting away from a firm and consistent position on the accession issue, leaning perceptibly towards autonomy verging on virtual independence. Both in the letters and the 1952 diary entries of Dr Prasad there are continual references to discussions on the Kashmir issue between the President, the Vice President and the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, Karan Singh and Sheikh Abdullah had each met the President separately on the various issues involved in the inter-relationship between the Union and the problem-ridden state. On 6 June, Karan Singh had met Dr Prasad and discussed with him the decision of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to have him as the elected constitutional head of state only for five years. But the important question, as Dr Prasad, averred, was that such autonomous election of the head of the state by the Kashmir Assembly would run counter to the constitutional provision of such appointment being made by the President of India for the states of the Union. ‘Because for any state under the Union”, Dr Prasad wrote in his diary, “ the Governor or Raj Pramukh was to be appointed by the President of India rather than be elected; and the latter method would create an anomalous situation which the Indian government would have to ponder over afresh.’

The Sheikh also had met the President, a little later, on 16 July, 1952, and spoken of  ‘working in Kashmir amidst various problems’ and reiterated that the Kashmiris ‘thought that it would be better for them and for India if they remained with India’. He also said that ‘it was a conscious decision on their part…[because] they were much influenced by the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi’. But Dr Prasad told him that considering the disturbed situation in Kashmir, it would have been better if ‘matters could have been discussed and settled’ when ‘conditions there became normal and bitterness was removed’ and that ‘the Constitution of Kashmir could [better] have been framed’ only then. To this Abdullah gave a rather specious reply. Admitting to the convening of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly as an error of judgement, he said:

I did not raise the question of framing the Constitution but we received a note from here to convene the Constituent Assembly – not on our own but on orders from here [Delhi]. I convened the Constituent Assembly and now when the Constituent Assembly is there, it has to frame the Constitution because we cannot avoid it by putting forth excuses like Pakistan. I did err in conveneing the Constituent Assembly.

Dr Prasad, however, ‘expressed [his] ignorance about the [Kashmir] Constituent Assembly having been convened under pressure from Delhi’. There was some obvious hiatus in the Sheikh’s statement that could not have escaped Dr Prasad’s notice because he had always been kept informed of the developments by Nehru and the Vice President Radhakrishnan; the latter having returned recently from Kashmir after a 10-day tour in which he had had meetings with Abdullah and the other leaders there.

As the political narrative in Kashmir rapidly unfolded, in spite of all the bon homie with Nehru, the Sheikh had ultimately to be dismissed from his premiership and put in jail on 9 August, 1953, due to his persistent demands for independence. Escalating from a firm pro-Indian position of restricted federal autonomy under article 370 of the Indian constitution in 1950, the Sheikh had slowly raised his demand several notches higher for full independence from the Indian union ostensibly on enticements from the US. As reported in an Indian journal, Adlai Stevenson, the American diplomat, had met the Sheikh twice in summer,1953.

Stevenson had assured Abdullah of much more than moral support [for independence]. A loan of $ 15 million would be on hand once Kashmir became independent; besides the US would ensure that ‘the Valley would have a permanent population of at least 5,000 American families, that every houseboat and hotel would be filled to capacity, that Americans would buy up all the art and craft output of the dextrous Kashmiri artisans, that within three years every village in Kashmir would be electrified…’

The pressure from the Hindu lobby, however, had also been increasing on Nehru for the Sheikh’s dismissal for his constantly shifting and recalcitrant postures. Though only three weeks before the dismissal and imprisonment of the Sheikh, Prasad had sent a note in a long letter to Prime Minister Nehru on 14 July, 1953, expressing his deep concern over the worsening Kashmir issue, analyzing all aspects of the complex problem, and giving his sagacious views in ample detail. The note had been prepared by him even as the crisis had gone on deepening, and he had even discussed it with Dr Radhakrishnan who had expressed his agreement with his views. All this while, Dr Prasad, in his wisdom, had also been in constant touch with the government’s developing policy perspectives as also the views of all the stake-holders on the issue.

The long note began with the words: ‘I thought after the conversation with you yesterday, I might let you have my views about things so that they might be available to you whenever you consider it necessary to know what I feel.’ It contained his frank and sincere opinion given to the Prime Minister as wise counsel and pragmatic guidance. He considered both the internal and the external implications of the problem – inasmuch as it pertained to the relationship between Kashmir and the Union on the one hand, and the India-Pakistan relationship vis-à-vis Kashmir on the other.

The first aspect of the problem squarely depended on the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir as already agreed between India and Pakistan on the mediation of the UNO. As Dr Prasad maintained, this could be either (a) ‘an overall plebiscite over the whole state of J. & K.’ or (b) ‘zonal or regional plebiscites’ which could again either be only on selective basis or ‘in all the zones’ held separately. As for option (a), Dr Prasad observed, the chances were ‘we would lose an overall plebiscite’ on strictly communal and religious grounds. The Vice President Radhakrishnan, after his recent return from Kashmir, had himself ‘told [Dr Prasad] that even Sheikh Abdullah thought that we would lose in a plebiscite’. The greater problem, however, was that whichever way the plebiscite went ‘a substantial minority’ - ‘sooner or later [to] be squeezed out’- would be left entrapped with the majority with the resultant insurmountable ‘problem of exodus and rehabilitation’. Hence, this hazardous solution of Kashmir as a whole going either way ‘whether as the result of plebiscite or otherwise’ was to be avoided by all means.

The second option (b) of ‘regional plebiscites’ also could either be of a strictly specific character ‘confined [only] to doubtful areas’ in Kashmir, or of a general character of ‘separate plebiscites in the four zones’, [namely] Jammu, Ladakh, Kashmir Valley and Azad Kashmir [or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, POK]’.Clarifying both these methods in the second option, he observed:

The first method would be to follow the suggestion of Sir Own Dixon [the eminent Australian Jurist and UN representative for mediation] and have plebiscite only in an area about which there is any doubt as to which way it would vote. It proceeds upon the assumption that the result of plebiscite in the areas which are left out of plebiscite is a foregone conclusion, and therefore both as a matter of expediency and convenience, the plebiscite should be confined to doubtful areas. This may be a solution which, if it is offered, we should accept and at any rate not reject offhand but consider all its implications before giving our reply to it. One of the implications of this may be that we may lose the Kashmir Valley, but we shall be assured from the very beginning about getting Jammu and Ladakh, and Pakistan similarly about the Azad area.

The results of the second all-four-zone plebiscite method, too, were unlikely to be different except for the cost and the scale and were also not to be rejected offhand. In the event, however, of a tentative possibility of a settlement ‘without plebiscite’, according to Dr Prasad, there could be two likely scenarios. The first would be:

An Agreement without plebiscite between India and Pakistan whereby the Cease Fire Line with such modifications as may be agreed to, should form the boundary line between India and Pakistan. From our point of view, this will of course be the best solution, better even than getting the whole of the state of J.&K…. But it is very doubtful that Pakistan will agree to it.

The skepticism about ‘an agreement without plebiscite’ in view of Pakistan’s belligerent stance was quite pragmatic. Even Pakistan’s conditional acquiescence in a general plebiscite was rather dubious. The ‘second solution’ of making the Kashmir Valley ‘an independent unit’ with consent of both India and Pakistan, ‘and perhaps also UNO’, was patently hazardous in view of India’s stated foreign policy of ‘non-involvement’, though it was more likely to be ‘acceptable to Pakistan’. This dicey solution also appeared to be favourable to American and British interests. But in that situation there was a clear possibility of ‘a conflagration in Kashmir’ in the event of ‘any clash between the two power Blocks’ which would willy-nilly involve India. Therefore, said Dr Prasad, “I would rather have the Valley as a part of Pakistan than as an independent State. If it becomes a part of Pakistan, it will not be free to have its own commitments with foreign countries, and if we settle with Pakistan our dufferences, there will be less danger of our getting involved.” Based on these assumptions, Dr Prasad, suggested three possibilities stated in order of diminishing preference: (a) settlement without plebiscite with a mutually modified Cease Fire Line as permanent boundary; (b) zonal plebiscite restricted only to the Kashmir Valley; and (c) the four-zone plebiscites held separately for Jammu, Ladakh, Kashmir Valley and POK. But in any case, he wrote: “We should not accept an overall plebiscite or a proposition requiring us to make the Valley an independent State and give our gurantee for that independence.” The reason behind the rejection of an ‘overall plebiscite’ being the humongous problems of exodus and rehabilitaion for either country.

Finally, towards the end of the letter, Dr Prasad takes up the second aspect of the problem, namely, the India-Pakistan relationship vis-à-vis Kashmir. In that, he firmly asserts, once the plebiscite concedes the whole or even some parts of the State to India, its relationship with those parts of Kashmir acceded by plebiscite to it becomes its internal matter and cannot, in any way, ‘be used or made an occasion for reopening and resettling relationship between India and Kashmir’. In other words, the results of the plebiscite agreed to between India and Pakistan would settle once for all the division of the State – in case such division happens - between the two countries, and the respective parts finally merging with either country will become their inseparable parts. And after the plebiscite the relationship between the respective part or parts of Kashmir and the country they choose to merge with will be an internal matter for that country, and will also consequently remain beyond the pale of any Indo-Pak negotiations. It would also clearly imply that ‘a demand therefore cannot be made by or on behalf of the State of J.&K, or any part of it for putting as one of the alternatives before the voters at the time of plebiscite the idea of independence either for the State of J.&K. as a whole or for any part of it’. Dr Prasad, in conclusion of his letter, states his opinion in unambiguous terms.

I am afraid I am not free from pessimism or even misgivings about the results of these negotiations….My misgivings are that if there is an overall plebiscite, we may lose the whole of the State of J.&K., and have to face the problem of the exodus and rehabilitation of practically the whole of the Hindu population. Our effort therefore must be to have a regional or zonal plebiscite if insistence is made by Pakistan on plebiscite. But it would be best to have a settlement without a plebiscite on the basis of India and Pakistan retaining the portions in their possession at present as defined by the Cease Fire Line. Sheikh Abdullah has talked about independence off and on, and there can be no doubt that he will try to take full advantage of the situation created by American intervention in the matter. Personally I would prefer non-involvement which can only be secured if we do not accept or guarantee the independence of J.&K. or any part of it.

The policy outlines stated in Dr Prasad’s detailed Note delineated with striking clarity the catch-22 situation in Kashmir. As expected, Abdullah’s recalcitrance had soon landed him in jail where he was to remain for the next five years and the stalemate in Kashmir continued. Perhaps, more because of the internationalization of the issue that pertained basically to the domain of the inter-relationhip between India and Pakistan. According to Dr Prasad, both the promise of a plebiscite in the Instrument of Accession and the reference to the Security Council of the military situation resulting from Pakistan’s camouflaged aggression in Kashmir were precipitate acts of ‘generosity’ done by Nehru on the clear promptings of Mounbatten, the then Governor General. As Prasad writes in a diary entry on 13 July, 1956:

India accepted the accession but in a fit of generosity also said that when the raiders had withdrawn and peace re-established, a plebiscite might be taken and accession finalized as a result thereof…It was at this stage [when Indian forces were about to recapture the invaded territoty] that in another fit of generosity India referred the matter to the United Nations where it has been pending since 1947.

Obviously, both these vital decisions with far-reaching future implications, were taken by Nehru on Mountbatten’s advice when Prasad only remained a silent colleague in the Cabinet. In January, 1958, after the Opposition’s sustained campaign, when Abdullah was released, writes M J Akbar:

Much had changed by then. The Kashmir Constituent Assembly had confirmed the accession to India and agreed on a Constitution which had come into effect on 26 January, 1957. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who had taken over the National Conference and the government, was still the Chief Minister, but some of his allies had fallen out by now, accusing him of being both inefficient and corrupt…The Sheikh’s supporters had collected under the banner of  the newly formed Plebiscite Front. It was a one point party…[maintaining that] the Constituent Assembly was no longer representative of the people’s will and therefore all its decisions were null and void…[and] that a fresh plebiscite [must] be held to determine the people’s will even in relation to accession.

With such a turn-around in the situation, Abdullah was rearrested on 30 April, 1958, and remained in jail till well after Prasad’s retirement from presidency and death. He was only released on Nehru’s direct intervention, merely a few weeks before the latter’s death in May, 1964. Abdullah’s hobnobbing with Pakistan and China on the Kashmir issue again led to his arrest a year later and a fresh stint in jail for the next three years. This see-saw game of Abdullah’s arrest and release tied more knots in the story of Kashmir which, since Nehru’s death, became more and more entangled and problematic. Indeed, the prognosis of the problem made in Prasad’s political advisory thus remained fully valid and vindicated even in the years to come.

[This extract is a slightly edited version. Reference Notes are given in the original book ‘THE HOUSE OF TRUTH : A Biography of Dr Rajendra Prasad’ by Dr BSM Murty, which is now under publication.]

© Dr BSM Murty

All photos: courtesy Google & Rashtrapati Bhawan Photo Archives

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Other extracts from the book which are available on this Blog (Scroll by year and date)

2011: May 28 : The Indigo Story; July 8: The Butcher of Amritsar; July 17: A Planter’s Murder

2014: Sep 14 : The Seven Martyrs; Dec 3 : Early childhood in Jeeradei

2015: Jun 30: Congress in disarray; Aug 27: Clash of Convictions; Oct 8: Presidential Itineraries;             

             Dec 20: Congress at crossroads

2016:  Mar 15: Election for Second Term; May 13: Visit to Soviet Union; Aug 25: Limits of Presidency
             Aug  28 : The Last Phase
2017:  Apr 15: Champaran Saga (The Indigo Story: Repeat of 28 May 2011); 13 July: Dr Rajendra Prasad: On Kashmir Problem

Other Important blogs

Sahitya Samagra : 5 Oct 2010 / On Premchand: 26 May 2011 / Has Hindi been defeated by Shivpujan Sahay : 7 Dec 2011 / Memoirs on Prasad and Nirala : 25-26 Oct 2012 / Shivpujan Sahay Smriti Samaroh: 27 Jan 2014 / On Amrit Lal Nagar: 18 Aug 2014 / On Bachchan : 27 Nov 2014 / On Renu: 3 Mar 2015 / On Trilochan: 1 Apr 2015 /Odes of Keats + Shantiniketan: 25 May 2015 / Premchand Patron Men: 3 Aug 2015/  Suhagraat: Dwivediji's poem: 13 Nov 2015/ Dehati Duniya: 8 Aug 2016/ Three stories of JP: 6 Jul 2016/ On Neelabh Ashk: 24 Jul 2016/ Dec 25 2016: Anupam Mishra: Paani ki Kahaani : 2017:  July 10: Doctornama: memoirs of Shivpujan Sahay

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